

HEGEL-STUDIEN \ BAND 42

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In Verbindung mit der Hegel-Kommission der Nordrhein-
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pérative, la société par actions, etc ...), sans pour autant présenter une théorie générale concernant le système à venir.

Dans ce cadre complexe et à facettes, Fineschi reconstruit donc la relation entre Hegel et Marx en l'articulant à plusieurs niveaux. Dans ce travail, l'auteur prête attention aux études philologiques de l'oeuvre „marxienne“, sans réduire la portée théorique générale. On y trouve beaucoup de suggestions et d'idées intéressantes. On trouve aussi beaucoup de références à la littérature critique, ce qui ne l'empêche pas de développer son analyse d'une manière autonome et affranchie de quelque idéologie que ce soit. A la fin, peut-être, il aurait pu tenter de proposer une vision théorique d'ensemble. La jonction entre un système socio-économique compris dans sa dynamique interne, et une aliénation conçue comme le résultat de la domination d'une logique qui vise à la reproduction du système, ne pourrait-elle pas nous conduire – disons-le – au coeur de la philosophie de Marx?

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Raya Dunayevskaya: The Power of Negativity. Selected Writings on the Dialectic in Hegel and Marx. Edited and introduced by Peter Hudis and Kevin B. Anderson. Lanham/Boulder/New York/Oxford: Lexington Books 2002. XLII, 386 pp.

The volume *The Power of Negativity* is an extensive selection edited by Peter Hudis and Kevin B. Anderson of Raya Dunayevskaya's (1910–1987) writings that cover her activity of philosopher, intellectual, and political activist from the 1950s to the late 1980s. Importantly, the collection testifies of her inexhaustible interest in and engagement with Hegel's philosophy throughout the changing political climate of over three decades. The book's focus is Dunayevskaya's reading of Hegel and in particular of Hegelian dialectic in direct confrontation with Marx and the Marxist tradition, and the place that the study of Hegel had in the development of Dunayevskaya's own 'Marxist Humanism'.

The texts that the editors gather together form the Reuther Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs of Detroit vary greatly for their form, style, character, and for the occasion of their composition. They range from academic essays delivered at philosophical conferences (for example, Ch. 10: "Hegel's Absolute as New Beginning," presented at the 1974 meeting to the Hegel Society of America) and published by Dunayevskaya herself, to letters (for example Ch. 2 for the seminal "Letters on Hegel's Absolute" of May 12 and 20, 1953; and Ch. 6–7 for her interesting correspondence with Herbert Marcuse and the letter to Erich Fromm), to works in progress (as for Ch. 3: "Notes on Hegel's Phenomenology"), and transcripts of lectures. Through these texts, the reader gains insight into the complex development of an intellectual who, emigrated from the Ukraine to the United States in 1910, has been close to Trotsky (as his secretary in 1937–38), has been involved early on in labor, socialist, and Black liberation movements, has developed the theory of state capitalism, confronted the intellectuals of the anti-Stalinist left, Sidney Hook's pragmatism (in the 1940s), and representatives of Critical

Theory (Herbert Marcuse, in the 1950s), has proposed the original philosophy of a 'Marxist-Humanism' (her major works are *Marxism and Freedom* first published in 1953 and *Philosophy and Revolution*, 1973), and presented to the American public the first English translation of a major part of Marx's 1944 *Economic Philosophical Manuscripts* and of Lenin's *Philosophical Notebooks* – crucial texts in the history of the reception of Hegelian dialectic within Marxism. Dunayevskaya's later work (in the 1970s and 1980s) further engages Hegel in relation to the women's liberation movement and the African American struggle, and further expands the understanding of dialectic in a critical confrontation with figures such as Georg Lukacs, Karl Korsch, Theodor W. Adorno, and Frantz Fanon. In this way, the texts of this collection by offering an important testimony of the development of American Marxism in the 20th century, contribute, at the same time, to the understanding of Hegel's role in this development. The latter is certainly a unique contribution of this collection.

The Power of Negativity provides material for a unique exegetical experience. Indeed, Dunayevskaya's approach to Hegel's text and more generally to his dialectic is unlike anything that has been done (and is being done) in the broad spectrum of Hegel's scholarship, and unlike anything to be found in the Marxist literature on the dialectic. While the editors' extensive Introduction ("Raya Dunayevskaya's Concept of Dialectic," xv–xlii) provides the best entry point in this rich volume, I want to dwell here on some of the distinctive characters of Dunayevskaya's reading of Hegelian dialectic taking the cue from some limited passages.

The uniqueness of Dunayevskaya's writings is to be encountered, first and foremost, in her utterly unconventional style. There is an enthusiasm in her approach to and in her appropriation of Hegel's texts that stems from the direct, unmediated connection that she establishes between Hegel's dialectic and the political reality of contemporary social struggles (she has been aptly called "a philosopher of the barricades"). In her analysis of Hegel there is absolutely no distance separating the two. This, at first, has the effect of throwing the reader (inexperience in Dunayevskaya's style but experience in Hegel's) completely off. This is true, in particular, given that Dunayevskaya always offers close readings of the Hegelian text, which is abundantly quoted and often commented on step by step in its unfolding. While someone unused to her style, given these premises, expects a conventional philosophical analysis, the meaning that she finds in the text is something that catches the reader entirely by surprise. The last chapter of the *Science of Logic* on the "Absolute Idea" begins as follows: "The Absolute Idea has now turned out to be the identity of the Theoretical and the Practical Idea." (In what follows, I use the English translation of German terms used by Dunayevskaya herself; accordingly, *Geist* will be rendered as Mind [see, however, p. 23 for her own questioning of the translation of *Geist* as Spirit or Mind].) To Dunayevskaya this can only mean that "[A]t this moment [...] the party is the identity or unity of the activity of the leadership and the activity of the ranks". (See p. 16, Ch. 2 "Letter on Hegel's Science of Logic" to Hauser, May 12, 1953.) (The peculiarly abrupt style here is certainly due to the fact that this is a personal letter to Hauser. Her analysis, however, should be compared to the one of the same chapter contained in the essay "Hegel's Absolute as New Beginning," to the Hegel Society of America meeting to see that the two occasions do not really change much

in the direction and intention of her reading.) And when Hegel says that the absolute idea is the only object and content of philosophy, this confirms for Dunayevskaya that "our object is the party," which, following the syllogism of the absolute method, "is the totality, the mediated result of the three layers," being what it is both in relation to the "proletariat outside" and to the "universal of socialism." Furthermore, as Hegel claims that "The Absolute Idea itself has only this further content, that the form-determinator is its own perfected totality," Dunayevskaya observes that "in the party [...] the 'form-determinations' or form of relations between leaders and ranks [...] tells the whole story. There is no content outside of that" (p. 18).

The reality of the social and political struggle confirms Hegel's Logic, while Hegel's Logic confirms the reality of the struggle. (Interestingly, the reflexive language of mirroring is not Dunayevskaya's.) The question of Hegel's 'actuality', often heard these days, does not stand for Dunayevskaya in need of long elaboration (see, however, pp. 320–322, Ch. 16 "Another Look at Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* as well as Ch. 10, pp. 185–186). Nor does she find necessary to explain or to justify the apparent leap leading to the identification between the absolute idea and the party. Beyond the first surprise, however, Dunayevskaya's reading brings a real gain in the understanding of the Hegelian text. In order to justify a surprise that certainly would be foreign to the Author, the reader is compelled to ask a question that is all too often eclipsed in the traditional scholarly readings of Hegel's Logic, namely: what is Hegel's Logic *about* (if not about the party)? A question that on the basis of Dunayevskaya's clear-cut answer leads immediately to the much debated issue of the *openness* of Hegel's dialectic as well as to the problem of its *application* or relation to history.

This latter point brings to the fore a second distinctive character of Dunayevskaya's interpretation of Hegel. Her textual analyses always and necessarily bear a date – a date within the history of socialism, of the development of Marxism, of the class struggle. In prefacing her reading of the last chapter of the Logic in the Letter of May 12, 1953, she warns that "this is not 1948 but 1953" (p. 16); while in the 1979 essay on the same Hegelian text she argues that "our age can best understand Hegel's Absolute" precisely because it has "been witness to a *movement from practice*" that no Hegel interpreter has witnessed before. But it is not just her age. It is Dunayevskaya herself who has followed very closely this movement of revolt ever since June 17, 1953. This and no other is the basis for her interpretation of Hegel's Absolute as a "new beginning." The final moments of Hegel's system – from the *Phenomenology* to the *Logic* to the *Encyclopedia* – are dedicated to the Absolute. Now, Dunayevskaya strongly rejects the common view that Hegel's Absolutes are conclusive, highest moments of a hierarchical, closed structure, and argues instead that Hegel's Absolute, being the concrete and absolutely negative moment of a development, is truly and necessarily "a new beginning" (see Ch. 10, p. 177 for example). It follows that whereas Dunayevskaya's reading of Hegel is always precisely dated, it can also gain the force of an exemplary reading to be repeated throughout history in order to yield new insights.

Finally, I want to stress how the two distinctive characters of Dunayevskaya's interpretation discussed above lead her to a very original selection of the Hegelian texts that become the focus of her reconstruction of dialectic. The Logic is central for

her, in particular in the last chapter, the "Absolute Idea" on which, as shown above, she comes back again and again in her career; but also in the introductory sections of the *Encyclopedia* logic (Ch. 5 for an important analysis of the "Attitudes of Thought Toward the Objective World"). Moreover, the last chapter of the Logic brings the Philosophy of Spirit ("or is it of Mind?" p. 23) to her attention. But here, unlike most Marxist interpreters, she does not focus on Objective Spirit. Rather, she moves on to Subjective Spirit (up to "free spirit") and Absolute Spirit (in particular the three final syllogisms).

Overall, this collection offers a very unusual and stimulating reading of Hegel's philosophy that while on the one hand may appear out of date, on the other should encourage us to approach the problems of our contemporary world in a new light, namely, with a fresher look at Hegel.

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Paul Cobben / Paul Cruysberghs / Peter Jonkers / Lu De Vos (Hgg.): *Hegel-Lexikon*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 2006. 552 S.

„Die Behauptung, daß die Lexifikation des Hegelschen Systems seine Verflüssigung fördere, klingt paradox; sie ist aber nichtsdestoweniger wahr. Das Hegel-Lexikon zeigt, welche verschiedene Wendung Hegel einem und demselben Begriffe jeweils zu geben wußte; erst das Neben- und Ineinander aller dieser Einzeldeduktionen enthüllt oft die Wahrheit des geistigen Prozesses.“ Vergegenwärtigt man sich, daß Hermann Glockner mit diesen Worten aus der „Einleitung“ seines *Hegel-Lexikons* (vgl.: *Hermann Glockner: Hegel-Lexikon*. A–Leibniz. Zweite, verbesserte Auflage Stuttgart 1957. XXIV f.) dieses offenkundig nicht nur selbst als Beitrag zur von Hegel anvisierten „Arbeit“, nämlich „durch das Aufheben der festen bestimmten Gedanken das Allgemeine zu verwirklichen und zu begeistern“ (vgl.: *GW* 9, 28), im Blick hat, sondern zugleich behauptet, das Hegelsche System selbst noch einmal dieser Aufgabe unterstellen zu müssen und können, um so sein Lexikon rechtfertigend dieses sogar „an die Stelle“ einer von Hegel selbst nicht mehr geleisteten „Gesamtorganisation des Hegelschen Systems“ (XXIV) treten zu sehen, dann ist es geradezu erfrischend nüchtern, wenn sich nun das von Paul Cobben als Unterzeichnendem, Paul Cruysberghs, Peter Jonkers und Lu De Vos gemeinsam bewerkstelligte, gleich betitelt *Hegel-Lexikon* in seinem „Vorwort“ (7 f.) auf die Erklärung beschränkt, aus dem Bewußtsein entstanden zu sein, „dass ein gegenwartsbezogenes Lexikon einen wichtigen Beitrag zum Fortkommen der Hegelforschung leisten könnte“ oder „[z]umindest [...] ein Hilfsmittel für einen leichteren Zugang zu den Originaltexten darstellen“ (7) würde.

Nach Walter Jaeschkes 2003 erschienener „entwicklungsgeschichtlich angelegte[r] Darstellung von Hegels Manuskripten und veröffentlichten Werken, von seinen ersten Aufzeichnungen bis zu seinen letzten Publikationen“ (vgl.: *Walter Jaeschke: Hegel-Handbuch*. Leben – Werk – Schule. Stuttgart/Weimar 2003. XII), mit der Jaeschke, zusammen mit seiner „Darstellung des späten ‚Systems‘“ (ebd.) als eines „System[s] in Vorlesungen“ (319) sowie zwei kürzeren Kapiteln zu „Leben“ und „Schule“, dank sorgfältiger